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INTRODUCTION 
I am dealing in this paper with the question of environmental and climate (in)justices in 
Eastern and South Europe (ESE). At first, I will refer the theoretical pillars of 
environmental justice and my statement is that there is an expanding sphere concerning 
environmentalism which has grounded the theory of climate justice. The environmental 
justice has been expanded to climate justice, because it increasingly addressed that the 
environmental and social conditions provide for individual and community needs and 
functioning and justice depends on the environmental conditions. It has been put 
forward here that populism could bring closer the importance of environmental and 
climate related disasters to the people’s everyday lives and experience. In the next part 
of this paper the connection of climate justice and social problems in ESE has been 
analyzed. The investigation elaborated here is based on a very important initiative called 
Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade (EJOLT) and its 
Environmental Justice Atlas. I will focus on two main environmental and climate 
injustice caused challenges: the first one is the situation of the Roma communities in 
ESE, and the second one is the emerging case of fuel or energy poverty. It has been 
raised here that an elitist populist regime, for instance in Hungary, how can damage the 
case of environmental and climate justice with instituted biopower. I will conclude this 
paper that we need to (re)enhance the social nature of environmental problems and this 
will strengthen the environmental consciousness in ESE. The relating discourse of 
environmental and climate justice in ESE is need to be based on environmental 
identities constructed on ethnical and social solidarity. Finally, we should have a look on 
the biopolitical structure of modern State. 
I. THEORIZING THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
1. Expanding Sphere 
It will be argued here that there is a broadening and expanding discourse about the 
environmental justice. I will briefly analyze the main notions of the expanded concerns 
of environmental justice. The earliest approaches concerning environmental justice 
focused on the inequity in the distribution of environmental bads (Bryant–Mohai, 1992; 
Pellow, 2004 and 2007). From that standpoint “environmental injustice was about social 
injustice being manifest in a host of environmental risks and bads” (Schlosberg, 2013: 
47). Bullard (2000) assumed that environmental justice as the core commitment that 
“all people and communities are entitled to equal protection of environmental and 
public health laws and regulations.” 
These environmental problems are characterized as social injustices, which hurt not 
only the poor people but the communities of colour. From this standpoint, 
environmental injustice has been framed as eco-racism so the main explanatory focus of 
environmental problems was racism.2 According to Mohai, Pellow and Roberts 
environmental racism is the result of what happens when people fear that their lives and 
2 Schlosberg puts it very clearly: “Environmental justice wasn’t simply about establishing the fact that 
more environmental bads and risks were being put on minority communities […] The practice, and 
experience, of racism has been at the heart of environmental justice discourse in the United States […]” 
(Schlosberg, 2013: 39.). 
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health are being disproportionately put at risk because of the color of their skin or the 
sound of their accent” (2009: 406.).3 
Benjamin Chavis, then executive director of the Commission for Racial Justice of the 
United Church of Christ, elaborated the term of environmental racism in the following 
way: “Environmental racism is racial discrimination in environmental policy making, the 
enforcement of regulations and laws, the deliberate targeting of communities of color 
for toxic waste facilities, the official sanctioning of the life-threatening presence of 
poisons and pollutants in our communities, and the history of excluding people of color 
from leadership of the ecology movements” (Bullard, 2000 cited by Mohai et al., 2009: 
406.). Thus, environmental racism “refers to any policy, practice, or directive that 
differentially affects or disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) individuals, 
groups, or communities based on race or color” (Bullard, 1996 cited by Mohai et al., 
2009: 406.). 
Schlosberg points out “[…] equity was a key frame in the initial consideration of 
environmental injustice. That early focus on inequity quickly expanded to include a 
range of issues from the generally unequal nature of environmental protection to the 
distribution of a range of environmental goods as well as bads […]” (Schlosberg, 2013: 
38.). The three main directions where the concept of environmental justice has been 
expanded are the analysis of justice concerning environmental justice, the factors behind 
environmental injustices and the definition of environment. 
Mohai et al. (2009) pointed out the main factors of environmental injustices. The first 
one is dealing with the economic considerations address both the impoverishment of 
impacted populations and the reasoning for industrial externalization of social and 
environmental costs. Their second point reveals that the industry and government seeks 
the path of least resistance to development, and poor and racial minority communities 
make easier targets. Finally, a distinct form of racism simply associates communities of 
colour with pollution (Schlosberg, 2013: 39.). 
Apparently, there is another explanation about the context of environmental justice 
and therefor claims concerning environmental justice remain contentious. Mohai, Pellow 
and Roberts show this wave of environmental justice and state that early environmental 
movements ignored social justice and equality issues and “there is not a consensus 
among environmentalists on whether broadening environmentalism to include justice is 
always a good idea” (Mohai et al., 2009. 406.).  
We can say that the discourse of race and ethnicity are “important aspects in 
understanding popular environmentalism, but they may not be central in every setting 
where environmental injustices are present” (Harper–Steger–Filčák, 2009: 5.). Martínez-
Alier (2003) cautions against applying the “environmental racism” as a universal 
framework to all environmental injustices. 
Nevertheless, there is a broadening environmental justice discourse which has 
absorbed several issues and has been applied a global level. It has been argued by 
Schlosberg that this discourse can be seen which extends beyond individual human 
beings and conceptualizes community level justice and justice beyond the human (2013: 
3 Moreover, the approach of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been based on this 
framework and defined environmental justice as “The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all 
people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, 
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.” Source: 
https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice  
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40). The concept of environmental justice has been become a broad framework which 
contains “analyses of transportation, access to countryside and green space, land use 
and smart growth policy, water quality and distribution, energy development and jobs, 
brownfields refurbishment, and food justice” (Schlosberg, 2013: 40). 
2. Environmental Justice as Climate Justice 
According to Schlosberg (2013: 38.): “Climate change has pushed environmental justice 
to more broad considerations of both environment and justice.” We can say that climate 
justice has become one of the main concept of environmental justice. Several 
environmental problems which used to be environmental justice questions currently 
can be seen and interpreted in climate justice framework. 
At first climate justice concerns applied existing distributive and social justice 
conception to the climate change (Schlosberg, 2013: 38.). This means that climate justice 
discourses focused on distributive fairness (Shue, 1993), historical responsibility and 
restorative justice (Agarwal–Nurain 1991), or a per capita equity approach to emission 
allowances (Singer 2004). Climate change has been interpreted as an environmental 
phenomenon of social injustices by several climate change movements. 
Climate change made the theory of environmental justice a more problem based 
approach focused on understanding and articulating the crisis caused by climate change 
at global and local scale. Two main shifts framed the concept environmental justice and 
these, in my view, turned environmental to climate justice. On the one hand, Schlosberg 
is convinced that “the breadth of the understanding of environmental and climate justice 
here both includes and moves beyond local environmental conditions, to expand the 
environmental justice frame and engage broader conceptions of social and global 
justice” (Schlosberg, 2013: 47.). On the other hand, the disastrous damages and 
catastrophes caused by climate change turned the discourse of environmental justice to 
the local experiences, for instance the resilience of communities.4 So, the increasing 
vulnerability to climate change at global and local and the demand of adaptation in an 
altered climate formed the concept of climate justice. 
The environmental justice has been expanded to climate justice, because it 
increasingly addressed that the environmental and social conditions “provide for 
individual and community needs and functioning” and justice depends on the 
environmental conditions (Schlosberg, 2013: 48.). Environmental justice movements in 
the United States promoted the case of environmental injustice at global level. Mohai, 
Pellow and Roberts pointed out that climate justice concerns have been evolved on 
right-based approach: “Much of the existing research on the internationalization of risks 
comes from legal scholars wrestling with problems of international and domestic law on 
the waste trade – specifically the legislation and treaties enacted to control these 
activities […]. The legal literature centers mainly on one major pressing question: To 
what extent can domestic regulation and international agreements control or minimize 
the waste trade?” (Mohai et al., 2009: 419.). Nations who suffering from imported waste, 
the impact of climate change are communities from the Global South populated by 
deprived people. In a certain sense climate justice is a globalized concept of 
4 “Environmental and climate justice activists and movements regularly address the actual material 
experience of changing environmental conditions, impacts on everyday life, and, crucially, the potential 
ways functioning and development are threatened.” (Schlosberg, 2013: 47.) 
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environmental justice and movements. For instance, shipping electronic waste creates a 
massive transfer of hazardous waste products from North to South (Mohai et al., 2009: 
420.). We can say that climate justice refers to the injustice dilemmas caused and 
exacerbated by climate change. As Mohai, Pellow and Roberts argued (2009: 420.).: 
“[c]limate change reflects and increases social inequality in a series of ways, including 
who suffers most its consequences, who caused the problem, who is expected to act, and 
who has the resources to do so” (IPCC, 2007; Kasperson–Kasperson, 2001). Climate 
justice can be understood not only in the context of individuals, but between states, race, 
ethnicity, class. 
Posner and Weisbach reject “the claim that climate change policies should be based 
on corrective justice or on an effort to redistribute from rich to poor” (2010: 169). They 
argue that emissions permits should be allocated on a per capita basis causes several 
ethical problems: “Such an allocation is not easy to justify from the standpoint of any 
ethical theory, and efforts to insist on it may well derail a climate treaty, ensuring 
serious harms to poor people in poor nations.” (Posner–Weisbach, 2010: 169.). They 
suggest that wealthy people have moral obligations to help poor people in developed 
and developing country as well. As the impact of climate change increases the 
differences between the rich and poor, this obligation has been increased. They put that 
very interesting point that it is not necessary that this obligation should be carried out 
through climate change treaties.5 Posner and Weisbach are convinced that an effective 
climate treaty will likely generate a surplus which is distributed within the parties who 
should to join this treaty because it must be designed to make signatories better off 
(2010: 170.). 
3. Environmental Justice and Populism: Repoliticization of the Discourse 
John M. Meyer (2008) has identified and described two main discourses and characters 
concerning US environmental movements, which are paternalism and populism. Meyer is 
dealing with the characterization of US environmentalists and would like to know “how 
environmentalists view the people and correspondingly how the people view 
environmentalists” (2008: 221.). This is all about the relationship of environmentalists 
to the people or the method which shows the environmental movements deal with the 
people. Meyer uses Margaret Canovan (2005) observation of the vagueness of category 
of “the people”, in her book she argues that: “Calls to ‘give politics back to the people’ 
exploit the ambiguity according to which ‘the people’ is first understood by contrast 
with the power-holders (and therefore as something less than the population at large) 
and then expanded to wield the authority of the sovereign people as a whole” (2005: 5). 
Based on Canovan’s view, Meyer puts it forward that populism can be understood as a 
contrast “between the interests and identity of ‘the people’ and those of the power 
holders”. On the other side paternalism elaborates “a unitary conception of the people 
and their true interests. Where such interests go unrecognised, ignorance, apathy, or 
egoism are typically diagnosed as the reason.” (Meyer, 2008: 220.). According to the 
paternalistic discourse: “We – the informed, engaged, public spirited – wish to protect 
you – the uninformed, apathetic, or egoistic – from the consequences of your 
5 Posner and Weisbach justify their skepticism with the following point: “It is not clear, for example, how 
best to discharge duties to the poor when they are ruled by corrupt governments or when powerful 
nations threaten or coerce them with bad intent.” (2010: 17.). 
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environmentally destructive ways.” (Meyer, 2008: 221.). This is not necessarily the case 
of self-conscious, but the identity and elitist approach (experts, elite environmental 
NOGs) of the affected movements can be perceived as paternalistic, because of its 
administrative rationalism and scientific expertise. In contrast, populist 
environmentalism emphasizes the tensions and antagonism between the elites and 
grassroots, and based on the local initiatives. This can be seen as a kind of realist 
approach, because the populist form of environmentalism “does not demand the 
transformation of widely shared values or the overcoming of people’s false 
consciousness or identity. Rather than diagnose the problem as ignorance or apathy to 
be corrected by knowledgeable professionals, the problem is attributed to remote 
decision-makers unable or unwilling to account for local knowledge and everyday 
experience” (Meyer, 2008: 224.). From this standpoint, the core reason of the 
environmental catastrophe is not just egoism or self-interest, but the powerful elites and 
corporations whose financial interest can destroy the life of the ordinary people. In my 
sense, this is the repoliticization of environmental and climate justice discourse. 
Although, in my view the main concepts of environmental and climate justice can be 
interpreted at the same time in a paternalist (environmental racism, justice of non-
human beings) and populist (environmental and climate injustice as social injustice) 
way, but there is a need to re-conceptualize and reinforce the populist side. I am 
convinced that the disastrous effect of environmental and climate injustices should be 
emphasized. We should bring close the meaning of environmental and climate related 
disasters to the “people’s everyday lives and experiences” (Meyer, 2008: 225.). Actually, 
this is the exact claim which has been elaborated by toxics movements in the USA. 
Szasz (1999) in his EcoPopulism is dealing with evolution of the local hazardous 
waste protest groups. It has been put forward by Szasz that these toxics movements are 
often characterized by the NIMBY, or “not in my backyard" phenomenon, but there is a 
core displacement and these organizations moved forward in radical environmental 
populism. Szasz described “how the movement expanded from hazardous waste to a 
host of other toxics issues. That expansion was accompanied by an increasingly 
comprehensive, totalizing critique of modern economic production and forms of political 
power.” (Szasz, 1999: 80.). The toxics movements cannot be characterized with a 
distinct ideological background, they use multiple political symbols and ideological 
legitimations.6 They have find the roots and tradition of the American agrarian populist 
movements, which has been based on the people “against the privilege and power of 
dominant, exploiting, selfish, and uncaring elites” (Szasz, 1999: 81.). This radical 
environmental populist attitude situated these in the landscape of American radicalism, 
on the other hand these movements can be distinguished from the political populist 
traditions and other environmentalist approaches. The new wave of toxics movements 
makes the agenda concerning the restructuring the relationship between the economy 
and society. In this sense, they emphasize the pollution prevention, mandatory recycling, 
mandatory source reduction, and outright bans on the production of harmful toxic 
materials and at the same time in accordance with these claims the radical 
democratization of politics (direct citizen representation in all decision-making, 
6 „Some in the movement legitimate their radicalism by appropriating the symbols of the American 
Revolution, the Declaration of Independence and its triad of inalienable rights, ‘life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness,’ and the Bill of Rights, and by emphasizing the radical, social movement aspects of the 
Revolution, such as the Boston Tea Party.” (Szasz, 1999: 81.) 
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empowerment of citizens and communities) (Szasz, 1999: 82.). From Szasz’s standpoint, 
this ideological radicalization of local hazardous waste protest groups “make common 
cause with other social justice movements and to embrace a much broader progressive 
agenda” (Szasz, 1999: 82.). These movements interpret environmental justice in a 
populist way which I claimed in conjunctions with the main discourses and characters of 
the US environmental movements. 
II. CLIMATE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN EASTERN AND SOUTH EUROPE 
1. The Region and Climate Change 
I will investigate here climate justice relationships of Eastern and South Europe (ESE). 
From political, geographical, economical and historical reasons this region can be 
analyzed according to very similar perspectives. Disasters, environmental and social 
impacts caused by climate change could be crate a common system of challenges in ESE. 
ESE contains 17 states: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Greece, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine. 
It has been investigated by Anders, Stagl, Auer, and Pavlik that in Central and Eastern 
Europe the mean annual temperature is projected to increase between 1 and 3 °C until 
the middle of the century and up to 5 °C by the end of the century (Anders et al., 2013: 
24–24.) (Figure 1. illustrates the projected change in temperature for the middle of the 
21th century).7 This temperature raising will cause several social and political problems 
across the region. It has been predicted that the “European warming will be higher than 
the global mean temperature increase […] In the autumn and winter months the 
temperature change in North and Eastern Europe will be higher (up to 3 °C) compared 
to South Europe (1–1.5 °C).” (Anders et al., 2013:25). 
 
Figure 1. Change of simulated mean temperature in Central and Eastern Europe in winter and 
summer as the multi-model mean 2036–2065 relative to 1971–2000 for the A1B greenhouse gas 
emission scenario (Source: Anders et al., 2013: 25.) 
7 This scenario has been taken different form European Global Climate Models produced in the European 
project ENSEMBLES (van der Linden–Mitchell, 2009). 
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They concluded that "[f]or all of Central and Eastern Europe a clear temperature rise 
is visible for the future which is projected to become more distinct at the end of the 
century. A general pattern is that the projected increase of temperature is highest during 
summer and lower during winter.” (Anders et al., 2013: 26). 
To deep understand the climate justice problems concerning the ESE it is necessary to 
show the relevant details about the climate change. The maps of Environmental Justice 
Atlas by Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade (EJOLT)8 highlight 
the spatial mal-distribution of climate change sources and its impacts. Figure 2. shows 
CO2 emissions/capita and Figure 3. is dealing with the case of carbon debt.9 The climate 
debt has been defined at People’s Summit in Bolivia in 2010, it means that “the 
overconsumption of the available capacity of the Earth’s atmosphere and climate system 
to absorb greenhouse gases by the developed countries has run up a climate debt to 
developing countries and mother Earth” (UNFCCC 2010: 15). CO2 Emissions/Capita and 
climate debt can be considered together, whereas positive figure constitutes a debt, 
while a negative is a claim (Warlenius, n.a.). One of the focus of EJOLT project is 
ecological debt, including climate debt, which is mainly based on carbon debt. 
8 Web: https://ejatlas.org/ 
9 EJOLT refers the definition of carbon debt: „There, the carbon debt of country A is defined as (a) over-
emission of CO2 by country A over time with respect to a sustainable level; i.e. emission levels that 
overshoot the absorption capacity of the atmosphere and are thus causing ecological impact in other 
countries and ecosystems beyond national jurisdiction; (b) over-emission of CO2 by country A over time at 
the expense of the equitable rights to the absorption capacity of the atmosphere of other countries or 
individuals.” (Warlenius, n.a.: 2.). This concept of carbon debt has been elaborated by Eric Paredis (2008). 
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Figure 2. CO2 Emissions/Capita in Eastern and South Europe 
 
Figure 3. Carbon Debt in Eastern and South Europe 
From these perspectives, we can say that ESE has relatively moderate CO2 
emissions/capita results, at the same time this region has a high carbon debt capacity 
which means huge risks in the light of climate justice injustices. 
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2. The Nature of Climate Injustice in ESE 
According to the EJOLT Environmental Justice Atlas the number of environmental justice 
problems has increasingly grown in ESE10 and some of them have a direct relationship 
with climate change (Figure 4.). However, the climate related problems are not on the 
political agenda in this region. 
 
 
Figure 4. Environmental Justice Related Cases from ESE (Source: https://ejatlas.org/) 
After the regime changes a new chapter has begun in the environmental history of the 
post-communist region. It has been proven by the collapse of communist regimes that 
there is a huge environmental and social bomb caused by the environmental 
irresponsibility. Unfortunately, the environmental and social systems have not been 
improved by the new liberal and capitalist systems. The core problems with democracy 
in this region are in conjunction with the environmental, climate and social problems. In 
my point of view there is a strong connection between the social and climate (or 
environmental) injustices. Moreover, the social problems appear in environmental 
contexts and the victims do not realize the environmental nature of these challenges for 
instance fuel poverty. 
Therefore, this region has not only huge carbon or ecological debt potential, but the 
risk of vulnerability caused by climate change is also relatively high in ESE compared to 
other parts of Europe (Figure 5.). 
 
10 181 climate justice related cases have been reported in the EJOLT database up to 17th March 2017 
(source: https://ejatlas.org/). 
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Figure 5. Climate Change Vulnerability in Eastern and South Europe 
In my view, this reflect in two main climate related injustices. The first one defeat the 
most vulnerable sociocultural groups in this region which is Roma community. The 
second one is relating to the lower (and upper) middle class group and called energy 
poverty. 
3. The Theoretical Aspects of Environmental/Climate Justice in ESE 
Environmental justice movement was said to be “a post-materialist movement 
supported largely by young, white, middle-class citizens” (Harper–Steger–Filčák, 2009: 
5.). This approach has mistakenly led a common-sense perception that low-income and 
socially excluded groups are not interested in and even more care less about the 
environment than their middle-class, majority counterparts. Doherty and Doyle (2006) 
argued that there are three major frames in transnational environmentalism: post-
colonial, post-materialist, and post-industrial environmentalisms. Martínez-Alier (2003) 
pointed out the "environmentalism of the poor” which combining elements of post-
colonial and post-industrial environmentalist approaches and address the preservation 
of traditional ecological knowledge and the struggle for environmental justice. In ESE, 
there both post-colonial and post-industrial aspects can be find in the environmental 
critique concerning environmental justice (Harper–Steger–Filčák, 2009: 5.). 
Nevertheless, there is a confluence of environmental activism and lessons learned from 
the US civil rights-based environmental activism which “has fundamentally shifted the 
discourse on environmental harms toward a more intrinsic or inherent valuation of 
humans and nature and points to previously untapped possibilities for integration” 
(Harper–Steger–Filčák, 2009: 6.). The environmental and climate justice discourse has 
been influenced by this phenomenon and it is obvious that anti-racism and 
environmentalism go hand in hand. I totally understand with the approach of Harper, 
Steger and Filčák who based their theory on Ladányi and Szelényi’s analysis of post-
socialist patterns of social exclusion (2006) and argue “that in the case of Roma in CEE, 
spaces inhabited by low-income Roma have come to be ‘racialized’ during the post-
11 
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socialist era, intensifying patterns of environmental exclusion along ethnic lines” 
(Harper–Steger–Filčák, 2009: 6.). 
Environmental justice advocacy in the US based extensively on the civil rights 
movement and was linked to bottom-up, community-based activism. In contrast to the 
US situation, in the UK environmental movement are led by environmental 
organizations with a highly-educated staff and international expertise (Harper–Steger–
Filčák, 2009: 6.). These are the main ways to constructing and theorizing environmental 
justice. We can understand with their conclusion which is relating to Central and 
Eastern Europe but can be generalized concerning the ESE region: “These possibilities 
could be expressed in CEE through the integration of environmental protection and 
social inclusion. To date, attempts at such policy integration or activist alliances have 
been rare; post-socialist policies addressing the conditions of Roma communities have 
been framed through an ethnic lens as ‘Roma issues’, resulting in an ethicized policy silo 
[…]. For mobilizations to be effective, activists in CEE must develop a vocabulary for 
addressing environmental injustices that is analytically applicable and strategically 
effective in the context of the European Union and especially at the local and national 
level […]” (Harper–Steger–Filčák, 2009: 7.). 
Summarizing, we need a common and well-established discourse concerning 
environmental injustices which is overlapping between environmental and social 
inclusion concerns. This new approach is needed to be based on identity politics which 
creates ethnic identities and moving steps forward to environmental identities. 
4. Roma Population and Climate Justice: From “Roma-issue” to Climate Discourse 
The environmental injustices concerning Roma people originated in the environmental 
transition following 1989, when the low-income Roma population in this region have 
borne the brunt of the post-socialist economic transformation. The Roma minority has 
mainly suffering from the following environmental problems and injustices: unequal 
access to sewage or wastewater treatment; unequal access to household water; unequal 
access to green space and playgrounds; waste management and illegal dumping by 
outsiders as well as residents; energy, including household energy efficiency and access 
to fuel for heating and cooking; poor housing quality, which relates back to energy 
efficiency, access to public infrastructure, and human health. The harmful effect of 
climate change (problems with drinking water; floods; heat waves) will affect 
disproportionately the Roma minority and will cause very similar environmental and 
climate injustices theorized as eco-racism. Without a common climate governance 
structures in ESE the massive climate and social injustices will cause incalculable 
damages. 
It has been pointed out by Tamara Steger that the state of the Roma communities and 
refugees demonstrates the urgency of an environmental justice agenda in ECE (Steger, 
2007: 19.). From her standpoint, the environmental and climate justices questions 
concerning Roma people have been investigated in the social justice and racist 
framework: “While it is widely known that the Roma experience racial prejudice and 
discrimination, more attention is needed on how this is reflected in their living 
conditions and manifested as health problems through the distribution of environmental 
benefits and harms […] While Roma take on a disproportionate share of the burden of 
environmental harms, they are frequently denied the benefits such as access to water 
and other natural resources.” (Steger, 2007: 19.). 
12 
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The social discrimination towards the Roma community has led geographical 
segregation which means that they have been incarcerated to the most polluted or high 
environmental risk areas. Roma communities have insufficient access to environmental 
good (such as clean water, sewage treatment) (Table 1.). Environmental and climate 
injustices contribute to devastating social conditions of these people, who do have an 
equal procedural and environmental rights incorporated by the constitutions ESE 
countries as non-Roma people. There is a huge tension between Roma and non-Roma 
people concerning the environmental the prevailing constitutional environmental rights 
sphere.11 
 Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Romania Slovak Republic 
Running water 45 4 34 65 32 
Toilet in the dwelling 75 15 46 65 44 
Sewage treatment 51 6 63 62 46 
Bathroom in the dwelling 70 12 41 66 37 
Table 1. Percent of Roma population living in households without access to facilities in the dwelling 
(2002) (Source: Steger, 2007: 20.). 
There is another side of the social and environmental discrimination of Roma 
communities, “poorly insulated housing and the widespread use of dilapidated 
woodstoves waste residents’ energy resources and also contribute to respiratory 
ailments in the winter months” (Steger, 2007: 20.) and it is very common that in these 
segregated areas the people heat with household and other waste which contributes the 
formation of smog. 
These environmental burdens endured disproportionately by the Roma people will 
be increased because of the constantly occurring impact of climate change (Steger, 2007: 
21.). This will influence the otherwise disappointing health records of the Roma 
communities. 
In my view, the main problem in this field is that there is no a shared environmental 
identity or identity politics in the Roma communities. Harper, Steger and Filčák have 
pointed out that “Roma in CEE are rarely perceived as ‘environmental subjects’ by 
themselves or others although struggles for access to housing and public infrastructure 
have played a critical role in grassroots organizing in many Roma communities.” 
(Harper–Steger–Filčák, 2009: 7.). Nevertheless, this is a huge challenge because on the 
one hand “since 1989 there has been a push from both Romani activists and the 
Hungarian state […] to identify and organize Roma as an ethnic group and to target 
policies towards them”, on the other hand “many activists and politicians fear that 
‘ethicizing’ political issues of Roma communities marginalizes those issues and 
promotes stereotypes, but without targeted programs, there is little incentive for 
members of the majority group to consult or include minorities” (Harper–Steger–Filčák, 
2009: 11.). There is a basic need to create a coalition from environmentalist and Roma 
civil rights activists which can address the racial side of environmental injustices 
without enhancing stereotypes and creating an environmental discursive or 
geographical ghetto (Harper–Steger–Filčák, 2009: 11.). Otherwise, Roma communities 
will bear the brunt of environmental and climate inequalities, because they are unable to 
mobilize social, political, economic resources (Pellow, 2001). 
11 According to the relationship between the procedural and connotational environmental rights please 
find more assumptions: Antal, 2014. 
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5. Energy Poverty 
In my concern, energy or fuel poverty is phenomenon which represents environmental 
and climate injustices not only in the marginalized social groups but in the middle class: 
not all low-income households are fuel poor and there are fuel poor households that do 
not belong to the lowest income percentiles (Waddams Prince et al., 2006). The energy 
or fuel poverty is referring the expanding sphere of environmental and climate 
injustices. According to Tirado and Ürge-Vorsatz “[t]he concept of fuel poverty can be 
located in the broad frame of the lack of or inadequate access to energy services, which 
refers to the lack access, mostly in developing countries to quality energy services as 
those provided, for instance, by electricity” (2010: 4.). Fuel or energy poverty is about 
the quality and affordability of energy services, energy efficiency. It means the inability 
to afford adequate energy services for the household. A proposed definition of fuel 
poverty by Brenda Boardman who stated that this is an “inability to obtain adequate 
energy services for 10% of a household income” (1991: 201.). This definition has been 
criticized because the lack of scientific rationality of the mentioned 10%. Tirado and 
Ürge-Vorsatz refer that fuel or energy poverty is a concept to be framed in more general 
considerations about poverty and deprivation (2010: 4.). Nowadays, fuel or energy 
poverty is getting more and more political importance, not just because of the climate 
change, but the energy bills and vulnerable customers. 
Tirado and Ürge-Vorsatz put is clear that “[c]onsidering the three factors often 
considered in the analysis of fuel poverty (energy prices, household income and energy 
performance of the residential stock), there are concerns about the incidence of this 
particular type of deprivation in CEE countries” (2010: 5.). In more general this is an 
emerging environmental and climate change caused deprivation in ESE. First of all, after 
the regime change in this region the stat-owed energy monopolies have been privatized. 
The acceptance of concept of the full-cost recovery tariffs and liberalized energy markets 
caused higher energy prices. The region countries’ GDP per capita income is lower than 
the EU’s average. Moreover, “the high energy consumption of the average residential 
unit is a consequence of the long time subsidized energy prices and the lack of basic 
energy efficiency requirements” (Tirado–Ürge-Vorsatz, 2010: 5–6.).12 
According to Buzar these tendencies caused that homes have become “prisons” for 
households unable to properly heat their living space (2007a). He has developed 
(2007b) three different models of “geographies” of fuel or energy poverty models 
concerning ESE and former Soviet Union (fSU) (Figure 6.) 
12 Tirado and Ürge-Vorsatz adds to this that “fuel poverty has been also linked to the inability of the 
region’s post- 1989 democratic governments to provide an adequate level of social protection and to 
develop adequate policy frameworks for improving the thermal efficiency of the residential stock 
occupied by the lower income households” (2010: 6.). 
14 
                                                        
This paper is prepared for Environmental Justice in the Anthropocene Symposium 
Colorado State University 
April 24-25, 2017 Fort Collins, Colorado, USA 
 
Figure 6. The geographies of fuel poverty in ESE and the fSU (Source: Bullard, 2007b: 73., cited by 
Tirado–Ürge-Vorsatz, 2010: 6.) 
On the one hand, there are not any standardized measurement frameworks for 
energy poverty and no consistent systems for data gathering and there is a little political 
discourse about these inequalities. On the other hand, fuel or energy poverty has 
become an emerging discourse of environmental or climate justice, even though the 
concept has not created a new structural identity or political subjects. The social groups 
affected by the various levels of fuel or energy poverty are multicolored and are 
struggling the different aspects of fuel or energy poverty. There is no group solidarity 
within the affected groups. 
6. Environmental and Climate Justice under Elitist Populist Regimes 
It has been elaborated here, that the populism could enhance and underpin the 
environmental and climate justice discourse and bring closer the meaning of 
environmental and climate related disasters to the people’s everyday lives and 
experiences. Although, not all kinds of populism, moreover there are several populist 
tendencies which can be very dangerous in conjunction with the case of environmental 
and climate justice. In my opinion, this is the situation in the populist regimes in ESE 
region (especially in Hungary). 
I have been dealing with characterization of contemporary populism in ESE (mainly 
in Hungary) and I have elaborated a political theoretical framework to analyze the 
emerging phenomenon of elitist populism (Antal, 2017). In Hungary, the Orbán’s regime 
cannot be characterized by pure populism: on one hand, it has elitist characteristics, on 
the other hand – if we identify populism as some kind of repoliticisation – the regime is 
considerably anti-populist. This paradox comes from the fact that not all of the political 
theoretical pillars behind the Orbán’s regime are populist. According to my 
interpretation (Antal, 2017: 9–13.), the (populist) political theory of the governing party 
alliance (Fidesz-KDNP) is based on three main pillars. (1) The first one is the concept of 
the Political, as elaborated by Carl Schmitt. Schmitt (2005, 2007) describes the 
depoliticization tendencies caused by liberal democracies; he also argues that the 
bureaucratic nature of liberalism promotes law instead of politics. (2) The second pillar 
is leader democracy (Weber, 2004), which argues that the political leader, who is 
creative and charismatic, has a strong political responsibility. (3) The third pillar is 
political constitutionalism, which is a counter-theory of legal or liberal constitutionalism 
and points out that the political institutions (parliaments and governments) cannot be 
restricted by legal institutions, above all judges or constitutional courts (Bellamy, 2007). 
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In the three mentioned political theories, populism and elitism have merged which 
has created an elitist populism regime: the various notions and approaches of populism 
has influenced these three concepts in different ways. While leader democracy is a pure 
elitist theory, political constitutionalism has strong populist elements, and the political 
theory of Carl Schmitt has a Janus face, because in the middle of this theory stands 
sovereignty, this is not popular sovereignty, but the sovereignty of the state – the 
sovereign state decides on the exception, enemies and friends.  
The elitist character of a populist regime is neither undiscovered nor unprecedented 
in the literature. For instance, Enyedi Zsolt (2016) emphasized the merging of populism 
and elitism: through the Hungarian example his study “investigates how elitism can be 
integrated into an overall populist appeal”. Investigating the extreme right-wing 
discourses in Italy and Germany, Manuela Caiani and Donatella della Porta (2010) have 
discovered that there are some “tensions in the conceptualization of ‘populism’ when 
applied to the extreme right (…). On the one hand, there is a hierarchical (elitist) and 
exclusive conception of the people, according to which the extreme right identifies itself 
as with the people (‘we’ are the people, the people are ‘sovereign’) but allocates to itself 
the task of protecting a passive people. Within an elitarian vision of the society, the 
‘pure’ people are in fact presented as unable to (re)act politically, and in need of a ‘guide’ 
(explicitly indicated in the right itself). The extreme right discourse on the people is not 
only elitist, but also exclusivist, as not only corrupt political elites but also other groups 
(e.g. ethnic minorities, political adversaries, supranational actors) are excluded from it.” 
(Caiani–Della Porta 2010: 19). 
The relationship between the elitist populist regimes and the case of environmental 
and climate justice is very controversial. Elitist populism despite its populist roots does 
not put any emphasis on social justice question. In this sense, there is no discursive 
space dealing with justice questions in the framework of environmentalism. These 
regimes damage the constitutional bases of environmental democracy and the 
environmental policy destroying the autonomy of environmental NGOs, neglecting the 
environmental procedural rights (Antal, 2015). As it has been showed in this study, 
there are more and more environmental injustice cases in ESE region, especially in the 
field of energy policy. According to the extension of Paks Nuclear Power Plant (Antal, 
2015: 12.) the last few years showed in Hungary that the energy policy is a fundamental 
area of environmental justice. The preparation of the significant related energy policy 
decisions, planning and determining the future, has been carried out without real social 
dialogue. In January 2014, because of secret negotiations between the Hungarian and 
Russian parties, the Orbán’s Government agreed to take out a EUR 10 billion state loan 
with Russia. The decisions were taken without any social participation. The situation is 
serious because the Hungarian Government imposes a huge financial, social and 
environmental burden not only on the present society, but also the future generations. 
This is one of the greatest environmental and climate injustice case in the Hungarian 
history. 
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III. CONCLUSIONS: ECOPOPULISM AND BIOPOWER 
1. Environmental Identity and Solidarity 
According to my concept elaborated in this paper, we need to (re)enhance the social 
nature of environmental problems and this will strengthen the environmental 
consciousness in ESE. Access to information and social participation can evolve the 
mentioned environmental consciousness which is indispensable in the context of 
environmental justice. We need to find the right solution between the under- and over-
ethicized frameworks concerning the ethnical problems caused by environmental and 
climate injustices. This means broadening racial and ethnic minority groups' 
participation in ecological activities can play an important role in transforming 
ecological attitudes and promoting social inclusion (Mohai, 1990). 
I am convinced that the discourse of environmental and climate justice in ESE is 
should be based on environmental identities constructed on ethnical and social 
solidarity. “Environmental justice reflects a growing wave of environmentalism as 
people seek justice in the distribution of environmental benefits and harms. 
Fundamental to this process is not only the application of distributive and procedural 
notions of justice, but a widening discourse on what constitutes an environmentalist and 
environmentalism. Further research on environmental justice […] need to explore the 
opportunities and barriers to an emergent environmental identity amongst the Roma, 
and their capacity to generate ‘new vocabulary’ around that identity.” (Harper–Steger–
Filčák, 2009: 25.) 
2. New Justice Discourse: Environmental Justice from Populist Perspective 
In my view one of the main causes responsible for the failure of the case of 
environmental and climate justice in ESE is that the environmental justice movements 
concerned and restricted themselves one issue and avoided becoming involved with 
other social justice challenges. The examples of waste movements in the USA can show 
the ecopopulist direction. According to Szasz “waste/toxics movement's development 
has taken it in quite another direction. Its leading organizations explicitly identify the 
movement with what they depict as a long and proud history of social struggles in 
America, with the labor movement, the civil rights movement, the antiwar and New Left 
movements of the 1960s, and the women's movement” (1999: 150.). 
I am convinced that there is a basic need to create vertical and horizontal solidarity 
structures in ESE societies. Without a broader social change agenda, the environmental 
and climate justice movements cannot achieve success. This requires the 
reinterpretation of environmental and climate justice challenges in a populist way and 
the first step could be the mentioned goal concerning to (re)enhance the social nature of 
environmental problems. As the situation elaborated by Szasz shows: “Toxic victims are, 
typically, poor or working people of modest means. Their environmental problems are 
inseparable from their economic condition. People are more likely to live near polluted 
industrial sites if they live in financially strapped communities. Some are exposed to 
toxics in the workplace, as well as at home. […] Issues of race and racism have had to be 
dealt with because toxics production and disposal takes place to a disproportionate 
degree in or near communities of the working poor and of people of color.” (1999: 151.). 
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All the environmental and climate injustices have been based on social deprivation 
and social injustices have environmental and climate implications. This could be the core 
message if the populist view of justice. This is one of the main experience of 
environmental justice movements in the USA: ”…environmentalism is a social justice 
issue that must necessarily forge solidarity with all the other great social causes of the 
day” (Szasz, 1999: 152.). 
3. Environmental and Climate Injustices as Consequences of Biopower 
A transition in modernity has been identified by Michel Foucault (1990, 2003), by which 
the State increasingly took as its task the care and regulation of biological, human life 
itself (O'Donoghue, 2015). In terms of Foucault, biopower “distribut[es] the living in the 
domain of value and utility […] has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather 
than display itself in its murderous splendor” (1990: 144.). Such a biopower begins with 
the modern State. According to Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005) the sovereign power is 
itself already biopolitical. Agamben stated that “the emergence of the technology of 
biopower signifies, not a break in the history of Western politics, but the expansion of 
the existing biopolitical imperative of the State, as bare life moves from the periphery to 
the center of the State’s concerns, entering in modernity into the political order as the 
exception increasingly becomes the rule” (O'Donoghue, 2015). Agamben puts it forward 
that modern State places the biological life (bare life) at the center of its calculations. 
In my point of view that biopower of the modern State has a huge impact on 
environmental and climate justice (Leonardi 2012), because the implications of 
environmentalism relating to the sovereignty of modern State. According to Lemke: 
“Agamben outlines this hidden foundation of sovereignty through a figure he derives 
from archaic Roman law: homo sacer. This is a person whom one could kill with 
impunity, since he was banned from the politico-legal community and reduced to the 
status of his physical existence. For Agamben, this obscure figure represents the other 
side of the logic of sovereignty. »Bare life«, which is considered to be marginal and 
seems to be furthest from the political, proves to be the solid basis of a political body, 
which makes the life and death of a human being the object of a sovereign decision.” 
(2011: 54–55.). 
In ESE region, we can say that the Roma communities and people affected by energy 
poverty are the modern “homines sacri”. Making and supporting the case of 
environmental and climate justice can be achieved by the biopower of the State. On the 
other hand, for instance the biopower of a nationalist populist regime could be 
catastrophic. 
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